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The issuance of protective orders pursuant to rule 26(c)(7) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 is predicated upon a moving
party's demonstration of good cause.2 Traditionally, motions seek-
I FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). Rule 26(c)(7) provides:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court ... may ... order ... (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development or commercial information not be dis-
closed or be disclosed only in a designated way ....
Id. Rule 26(c)(7) gives the court the power to control the use of the materials discovered,
Dore, Confidentiality Orders-The Proper Role of the Courts in Providing Confidential
Treatment for Information Disclosed Through the Pretrial Discovery Process, 14 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1978), and counterbalance the trial court's inability to limit significantly the
scope of discovery, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Dore, supra, at 6 (rules anticipate
discovery without judicial supervision). But cf. Comment, Protective Orders Prohibiting
Dissemination of Discovery Information: The First Amendment and Good Cause, 1980
DUKE L.J. 766, 767 n.7 (in the course of discovery, parties will often be compelled to disclose
confidential information).
District courts have attempted to comply with the Supreme Court's directive that dis-
covery be liberal, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947), by compelling discovery
of most materials and by protecting the disclosing party's interests with a protective order,
Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1983);
see In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 179, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (rule 26(c)(7)
enables district courts to protect parties from abuse of discovery); see also Textured Yarn
Co. v. Burkart-Schier Chem. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (court has broad
discretion to grant protective orders); Ledge Hill Farms, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 FED. R.
SERv. 2d (Callaghan) 715, 716-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (disclosure of trade secrets limited to liti-
gation purposes). Protective orders allow discovery to proceed efficiently with a minimum
amount of dispute over whether allegedly confidential materials are discoverable. See Note,
Modification of Protective Orders: Balancing Practical Considerations and Addressing
Constitutional Rights, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1011, 1036 (1980).
The broad scope of discovery permitted by the federal rules is intended to facilitate the
flow of communication between litigants. Comment, supra, at 767 & n.7. The primary goal
of the federal rules is to shift the focus from complicated pleadings to extensive discovery
accompanied by simple notice pleading, thereby enhancing the pretrial preparation. See
Dore, supra, at 2; Montgomery, Changes in Federal Practice Resulting from the Adoption
of the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 337, 346-47 (1941). The only limita-
tion placed upon the scope of discovery is that the information be unprivileged and relevant
to the subject matter of the claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); 4 J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.68, at
26-491 (2d ed. 1983). The party moving for a protective order carries the burden of proving
good cause. See Kiblen v. Retail Credit Co., 76 F.R.D. 402, 404 (E.D. Wash. 1977). What
must be proved in order to carry this burden will depend largely upon the circumstances
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ing these orders have been evaluated by balancing the moving
party's expectations of confidentiality against the opposing party's
expectations of use.3 Recent decisions, however, have injected a
constitutional analysis into this traditional good cause test by ex-
amining both the moving party's fourth amendment right of pri-
vacy and the opposing party's first amendment right of free ex-
and whether the moving party seeks to limit the scope of discovery, or simply to restrict the
use of discovered materials. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey,
J., dissenting); Note, supra note 1, at 1013 (issuance of protective order is discretionary).
Good cause under rule 26(c) is established by demonstrating that unrestricted discovery or
use of discovered materials will cause the moving party "annoyance, embarrassment, op-
pression, or undue burden or expense." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see Rhinehart v. Seattle Times
Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 249, 654 P.2d 673, 686 (1982), af'd, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). The
district court has discretion to decide whether good cause has been shown and usually re-
quires a specific factual demonstration that serious harm will result without the order. See
In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 210; Comment, supra note 1, at 771. Mere conclusory allegations
of harm are insufficient. See Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21, 23
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 F.R.D. 318, 321-
22 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Trade secrets and business and commercial information have been traditionally entitled
to protection from disclosure during litigation and have usually established the required
showing for good cause. See Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310
(E.D. Pa. 1969); cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 (1939) (tort cause of action for misuse of
business information).
' See National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir.
1981); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
United Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 217 (D. Del. 1960). Seeking to protect
confidential commercial information, the moving party may assert a valid expectation of
commercial privacy. See supra note 2. Similarly, the opposing party's right of access to
discovery materials is conditional; the federal rules authorize the issuance of orders limiting
this right to exclusive use in connection with trial preparation. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d
176, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). But see Comment, In re San Juan Star:
Discovery and the First Amendment, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 229, 229-30 (1982) (litigant has
valid interest in publicizing his suit). The opposing party's expectation of extrajudicial use
of the discovered materials is frequently disappointed since many judges often issue protec-
tive orders sua sponte as a condition of compelling discovery. See Quinter v. Volkswagen of
Am., 676 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1982); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 97 F.R.D.
424, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). An opposing party may be motivated by a desire to use the dis-
covered materials extrajudicially to affect the outcome of the trial, but such use cannot be
deemed an expectation worthy of protection. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 63. The party
contesting the protective order normally has little first amendment interest in the dissemi-
nation of the information obtained through the discovery process. Id. at 65. Once the discov-
ered material is used at trial, however, the moving party's confidentiality interests in it are
lost. See, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (information used at
trial becomes part of public record); see National Polymer, 641 F.2d at 424.
In determining whether good cause exists, courts have also given consideration to the
purposes underlying the discovery provisions, such as the narrowing of issues, the obtain-
ment of evidence, and the need for adequate pretrial preparation. See Berry v. Haynes, 41
F.R.D. 243, 244 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
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pression.4 Courts also have begun to recognize that corporations
enjoy a constitutional right of privacy.5 Determining whether to
grant a rule 26(c)(7) protective order therefore triggers a complex
judicial balancing of conflicting constitutional rights.
This Note will focus upon the potential constitutional clash
between the right of privacy and freedom of expression that may
4 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2205-08 (1984); In re San Juan
Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 113-18 (1st Cir. 1981); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 186-91 (D.C. Cir.
1979). Until recently, the Halkin decision generally was regarded as the keynote decision in
the constitutional treatment of discovery. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 2-3. According to the
Halkin tripartite test, before a district court may issue a protective order: "[1] the harm
posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; [2] the restraining order must be
narrowly drawn and precise; and [3] there must be no alternative means of protecting the
public interest which intrudes less directly on expression." Halkin, 598 F.2d at 191. In addi-
tion, the district court must make extensive findings of fact on each of these three elements.
Id. at 192.
The Halkin analysis rests on the premise that, absent a protective order, the federal
rules permit unlimited use of discovered information. Id. at 188. Unquestionably, protective
orders are intended to restrain expression. See Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the
First Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1645, 1645 (1980); Comment, supra note 1, at 772.
There is concern that protective orders are substantially similar to constitutionally violative
prior restraints in that both protective orders and prior restraints of expression are ruled
upon before publication and are directed at particular parties. See Note, supra, at 1651.
Arguably, protective orders are the same in form as prior restraints, yet lower courts that
have found a first amendment question implicit in protective order review have not been in
agreement on whether protective orders prohibiting dissemination of discovered information
constitute prior restraints. Comment, supra, note 1, at 773-78; see Rodgers v. United States
Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir. 1976) (dictum) (asserting waiver of first amend-
ment rights); International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1963) (ac-
knowledging possibility of first amendment right but avoiding issue); Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (protective orders normally constitute
prior restraint). The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that protective orders should
not be subjected to the strict scrutiny with which prior restraints are generally reviewed.
See Seattle Times, 104 S. Ct. at 2207.
1 See G.M. Leasing Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977); Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967). The corporate
constitutional right of privacy, which is based upon the fourth amendment guarantee of
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, was first recognized in 1906. See Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
6 Cf. Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6 (1982)
(court weighed individual asserted right of privacy under California Constitution against
need for discovered information); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (court
considered public interests in discovery process and first amendment interests in unfettered
expression). Cases reviewing protective order motions from a constitutional perspective il-
lustrate the complexity of such review. See supra note 4. It is suggested that the juxtaposi-
tion of two conflicting constitutional rights that requires every district court reviewing a rule
26(c)(7) motion to engage in two constitutional rulings is antithetical to the principle of
avoiding constitutional adjudication whenever possible. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (matters should be resolved with-
out constitutional ruling if possible); see also infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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arise under recent protective order jurisprudence. The validity of
the assertion that corporations are entitled to a constitutional right
of privacy will be examined and the continued application of a
constitutional analysis to a litigant's desire freely to express dis-
covered information will be criticized. Lastly, this Note will suggest
the inappropriateness of superimposing a constitutional analysis
on protective order litigation and will propose a simplified judicial
approach to rule 26(c)(7) motions.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF PROTECTIVE
ORDERS
Until recently, rule 26(c)(7) motions were resolved solely by
applying a good cause test that did not encompass an analysis of
constitutional rights.7 Privacy expectations were based solely on
the common-law notion that trade secrets revealed during litiga-
tion merit judicial protection.8 In Textured Yarn Co. v. Burkart-
Schier Chemical Co.,9 an action for misappropriating trade secrets
gave rise to a motion for a protective order to prevent the secrets
from being publicly disseminated. 10 The court granted the motion
in light of business factors and commercial fairness without ad-
dressing corporate expectations of a constitutional right of pri-
vacy." Similarly, in United States v. International Business Ma-
chines Corp.,'2 the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of New York evaluated the severity of the business injury that the
movant would suffer from disclosure in denying a motion for con-
7 See United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Textured Yarn Co. v. Burkart-Schier Chem. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D. Tenn.
1966).
8 See Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
supra note 3; cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 (1939) (tort cause of action for misuse of
business information). Traditionally, courts have applied one of three legal theories in pro-
tecting confidential commercial information: (1) the existence of property rights in the in-
formation, see Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 37, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889); (2) the presence of
a contractual agreement prohibiting disclosure, see Westervelt v. National Paper & Supply
Co., 154 Ind. 673, 674, 57 N.E. 552, 554 (1900); or (3) the existence of a fiduciary duty not to
disclose the information, see E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S.
100, 102 (1917).
9 41 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
10 See id. at 159.
n See id. at 159-60.
12 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" See id. at 48-49.
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tinued protection of a deposition from dissemination.14 In Interna-
tional Business Machines, Chief Judge Edelstein acknowledged
that the movant, relying on the common-law tradition of protect-
ing trade secrets, came to court with an expectation that the
secrets would be protected, 15 and, as in Textured Yarns, the Inter-
national Business Machines court ruled on the motion without ac-
knowledging a constitutional expectation of privacy.'6
Originally, an opposing party's expectations of use of commer-
cial information obtained through the litigation process also were
evaluated on a non-constitutional level.' 7 In International Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Koons,'" the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in issuing an order to protect the deposition of a corporate officer
in a libel action, discarded without discussion the appellant's con-
tention that protective orders implicate constitutional rights in in-
stances of disclosure of discovered information. 19 In Rodgers v.
United States Steel Corp.,20 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit suggested that even if protective orders did implicate first
amendment rights of dissemination, such rights were waived by the
litigant's decision to enjoy the benefits of discovery.2'
These earlier holdings can be contrasted with those of In re
Halkin22 and In re San Juan Star Co.2  The plaintiffs in Halkin,
seeking relief for violation of their constitutional rights, alleged
that they were being scrutinized by the CIA because of their in-
volvement in lawful anti-war protest activities.24 When the plain-
tiffs expressed their intention to disseminate certain discovered in-
formation, the government successfully moved for a protective
order.25 Reversing the trial court's decision to grant a protective
" See id. at 42-43.
" See id. at 45.
'6 See id. at 42; Textured Yarn, 41 F.R.D. at 159.
See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1976); Inter-
national Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1963); Textured Yarns Co. v.
Burkart-Schier Chem. Co., 41 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
10 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
9 See id. at 407.
20 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1975).
21 See id. at 1006. Although Koons and Rodgers are recognized as the earliest attempts
by litigants to engraft a constitutional analysis upon protective order litigation, it should be
noted that neither case dealt with commercial information. See Rodgers, 536 F.2d at 1002-
04; Koons, 325 F.2d at 404-05.
22 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
2 662 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981).
24 See 598 F.2d at 179-80.
25 See id. at 180-82.
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order, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
applied a complex constitutional analysis and concluded that pro-
tective orders, like prior restraints, trigger the strictest judicial
scrutiny.26
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit chose a different
approach from that of the Halkin court in In re San Juan Star
Co.27 The San Juan Star litigation arose from a series of terrorist
activities in Puerto Rico.28 The district court issued several protec-
tive orders to curtail possible prejudicial effects on the jury caused
by the high degree of publicity the trial was receiving. 29 Ruling on
a challenge to the protective order, the First Circuit concluded that
only limited first amendment concerns were present in protective
order litigation.30 The San Juan Star court concluded that the
prior restraint approach was inapposite and asserted that "the ap-
propriate measure of [these] limitations [is] a standard of 'good
cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the First
Amendment concerns at stake ...."31
Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.3 2 represented the first in-
stance of collision between privacy and expression in the context of
protective orders.33 In Tavoulareas, Mobil Oil Corporation inter-
vened in a libel action between William Tavoulareas, its president,
and the Washington Post to protect confidential information that
was ordered to be produced.34 The district court lifted the seal on
the documents,3 5 but it was reinstated by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.3 6 The appellate court concluded
that only a very limited right of free expression attached to discov-
ered materials37 and that right was insufficient to rebut Mobil's
fourth-amendment-based corporate right of privacy. 8 The circuit
court subsequently vacated and remanded the case for reconsidera-
See id. at 183-96.
662 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981).
38 See id. at 110-11.
29 Id. at 111.
30 Id. at 113-14.
31 Id. at 116.
724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 724 F.2d 1010 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See 724 F.2d at 1017-29.
3 Id. at 1012-15.
Id. at 1013, 1015.
36 Id. at 1029.
3 Id. at 1025-29.
2 Id. at 1029.
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tion39 in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Seattle Times
Co. v. Rhinehart.40
Rhinehart represents an effort by the Supreme Court to clar-
ify the confused precedent addressing the constitutional ramifica-
tions of protective orders.4' In Rhinehart, the leader of a religious
organization, Keith Rhinehart, sued the Seattle Times for libel,
and, during pretrial preparation, the newspaper sought discovery
of confidential financial information from Rhinehart and his organ-
ization.42 The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the trial
court's decision to protect the information from dissemination.43
Asserting that its first amendment rights had been violated, the
Seattle Times petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court.44 Writing for the Court, Justice
Powell affirmed the state court decision, 45 concluding that a mid-
dle-level constitutional analysis should be applied to rule 26(c) mo-
tions.46 The Supreme Court instructed lower courts reviewing pro-
tective order motions to "consider whether the 'practice in
question [furthers] an important or substantial government inter-
est unrelated to the suppression of expression' and whether 'the
limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular govern-
mental interest involved.' ,,47
CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY: A MISCONCEPTION
The continuing expansion of corporate constitutional rights
has often led to the conclusion that confidential commercial infor-
mation is protected by a constitutional right of privacy.48 Indeed,
the Tavoulareas court disregarded precedent49 and equated a cor-
19 Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 n. * (D.C. Cir. 1984).
40 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984).
41 See id. at 2205.
42 Id. at 2202-04.
43 Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 258, 654 P.2d 673, 691 (1982).
41 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983).
45 Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2206-07 (1984).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 2207 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
46 See supra notes 5 & 6.
49 See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 455 (1977); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-605 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-84 (1965). In
Tavoulareas, Judge Tamm first examined the constitutional right of privacy as set forth in
Whalen and Nixon. See Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1019 (D.C.
Cir.), vacated, 724 F.2d 1010 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1984). The right of privacy is not specifically
19841
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poration's privacy expectations in confidential commercial infor-
mation to an individual's expectation of protection from forced
disclosure of personal information.50 While the Supreme Court has
previously recognized a corporate right of privacy, this right has
not been deemed coextensive with the penumbral privacy rights
enjoyed by individuals.51 Traditionally, corporate privacy expecta-
tions were based upon the search and seizure clause of the fourth
amendment. 52 While the fourth amendment right of privacy for
enumerated anywhere in the Constitution, but is a fundamental right based on a conglomer-
ation of constitutional protections. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 458-61 (2d ed. 1983). Protection against invasions of "the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life" is provided by the first, fourth, and fifth
amendments. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885). Traditionally, this right has
been perceived as exceptionally personal and individual, and has been conferred to prevent
forced disclosure of personal information. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 4357; Whalen, 429 U.S. at
599; Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981).
Constitutional privacy is rooted in human values and natural law. See J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra, at 459; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (right of privacy
based on sanctity of marriage); R. STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION-SEcRECY,
ACCESS AND DISCLOSURE 51 (1980) (right of privacy grounded in human experience). It has
been referred to as the right to be left alone. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946).
50 See Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1019-21, 1023-24. The Tavoulareas court concluded
that the balancing test proposed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), would be the appro-
priate constitutional standard for determining the degree of permissible intrusion on corpo-
rate privacy, Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1022-23. The test formulated in Terry required "bal-
ancing the need to search . . . against the invasion which the search . . . entails." Terry,
329 U.S. at 21. In Whalen v. Roe, however, the Supreme Court limited the application of the
Terry test to "affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy
during the course of criminal investigations." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977).
The invasion in Tavoulareas was not an affirmative invasion, but a "constructive search": a
court order to produce, or allow dissemination of materials, which requires only proof that it
is a reasonable exercise of a lawful power. Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 202 & n.28 (1946) (subpoena to produce document is constructive search). The
analogy between individual privacy and corporate privacy made in Tavolareas is contrary to
the weight of authority, which indicates that corporate expectations of privacy are severely
limited. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974) (no substantial claim of privacy
regarding records of collective entity); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 184 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (right of privacy does not apply to profit-
seeking organizations or corporations); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652
(1950) ("corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of right to
privacy"); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922) (fourteenth amendment
does not confer corporate right of privacy).
s See supra notes 49-50; infra note 61.
62 See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (corporations have
fourth amendment right of privacy); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920) (corporations protected from unreasonable searches); United States v. Hub-
bard, 650 F.2d 293, 305-06 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (widespread acceptance of corporate privacy
expectations under Constitution and state law); see also United States v. Universal Mfg.
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corporations has been affirmed in some recent decisions,5 3 it is sug-
gested that an historical examination reveals that the policies un-
derlying this right have ceased to exist.
The corporate fourth amendment right of privacy was an out-
growth of the doctrine of economic due process. 4 This doctrine
was a 19th-century judicial response to Congress' failure to endow
corporations with "constitutional personhood"5 5 and served as the
cornerstone upon which various corporate constitutional rights
were erected.56 The doctrine of economic due process, however, was
Co., 525 F.2d 808, 811-12, 812 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975) (unrestricted government access to corpo-
rate information is constitutional deprivation); In re Lukich, 335 F. Supp. 557, 558 (N.D.
Ohio 1971) (corporations insulated from unreasonable searches and seizures); Shultz v. Ye-
ager, 293 F. Supp. 794, 800 (D.N.J. 1967) (corporate records enjoy fourth amendment pro-
tection), aff'd, 403 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 691 (1969).
13 See First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 & n. 14 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
" See Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corpo-
rate Speech, 90 YALE L.J. 1833, 1845-50 (1981). The economic due process doctrine stressed
the importance of private ownership of property. Id. at 1847. The doctrine emphasized the
freedom of the "person," and treated fictitious and natural persons almost identically. Id. at
1848. Such treatment allowed the courts to emphasize the freedom to contract, while focus-
ing entirely upon the invading power of the states, and virtually ignoring the effects of cor-
porate accumulation of power. Id. at 1848-49. As the doctrine of economic due process ex-
panded, the Supreme Court was frequently required to determine to what extent democratic
authority could interfere with private organizations. Id. at 1845-46. The difficulty created by
the concept of "fictional personhood" became apparent when dealing with constitutional
relationships. See Ratner, Corporations and the Constitution, 15 U.S.F.L. REv. 11, 11
(1981). Individual and governmental units were the only types of entities mentioned in the
Constitution; therefore the courts attempted to deal with corporate constitutional claims by
constitutionally classifying the corporation. Id. at 11-12. The Supreme Court resolved this
dilemma by relying upon the determination that corporations were "artificial beings" in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
55 See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No.
7,052) (only natural persons can be constitutional persons); see also Graham, An Innocent
Abroad: The Constitutional Corporate "Person," 2 UCLA L. REv. 155, 166 (1955) (that
corporation not constitutional person was law of the land). During the Civil War period the
number of corporations significantly increased and interstate activity flourished, particularly
in the railroad and insurance industries. See Graham, supra, at 166. Faced with an inactive
Congress and overactive state legislatures, the Supreme Court began to invalidate state ac-
tions that claimed corporate property without due process. Id. at 167. Thus, in 1880, the
Court granted corporations fourteenth amendment protection from state actions perceived
as injurious to the private ownership of property. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac.
R.R., 118 U.S. 395, 410 (1886). In Santa Clara, the Court refused even to hear an argument
on the issue of corporate "constitutional personhood," and simply held categorically that
corporations were entitled to constitutional protections. Id. at 396.
"' See Graham, supra note 56, at 185-87; Ratner, supra note 55, at 15; Note, supra note
55, at 1835-36, 1847. In 1906, the corporate right of privacy under the fourth amendment
was first recognized in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). However, the Hale Court
concluded that individuals acting in corporate form retained a right of privacy under the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:103
abandoned when congressional regulation of economic activity in-
creased in the 1930's. 57 In fact, by 1941 the Supreme Court had
overruled most of the significant economic due process decisions.5 8
In so doing, the Court failed to consider the status of a growing
body of substantive corporate constitutional rights that were an
outgrowth of the economic due process doctrine. 9 It is suggested
that the privacy rights of individual corporate directors, officers,
and shareholders are the only appropriate vestiges of this long dis-
carded legal theory. 0 Unfortunately, recent decisions,61 and partic-
ularly the assertion that corporations have a constitutional right of
fourth amendment, not that the corporate personality itself had a fourth amendment right.
See id. Hale adopted the association theory of corporations. See R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF
THE CORPORATION 40-42 (1979). In Tavoulareas, however, the court implied that the consti-
tutional right of privacy is vested in the corporate person itself. See Tavoulareas v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 724 F.2d 1010, 1010 n.* (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
57 See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982)); National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No.
198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976 & Supp. 1981)); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e,
77k, 77m, 77o, 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p-78hh (1982)); Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48
Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)); see also Note, supra note 55, at
1848 n.85.
8 See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941) (overruling Ribnik v. McBride,
277 U.S. 350 (1928)); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941) (overruling
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400
(1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); see also Note, supra
note 55, at 1850-51 (from 1937 to 1941, Court abandoned central economic due process hold-
ings of previous 50 years).
5" See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937) (double jeopardy protec-
tion under fifth amendment); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (first
amendment right of freedom of press); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (fourth
amendment privacy rights). Unfortunately, no consistent principle emerged as the basis for
granting or denying corporate constitutional rights. See O'Kelley, The Constitutional
Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation Af-
ter First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1347-48 (1979).
80 See H. HENN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTER-
PRISES 25 (2d ed. 1970); R. HESSEN, supra note 57, at 41; Ratner, supra note 55, at 12-13. It
has been deemed illogical and dangerous to bestow rights that are rooted in human values
upon the corporate person. Ratner, supra note 55, at 29. Like all other types of organiza-
tions, the corporation draws qualities from its members and thus may draw upon the rights
of its shareholders, officers, and directors, but it cannot claim that those rights personally
vest within the corporate entity itself. See R. HESSEN, supra note 57, at 41-42.
"' See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 766-83 (1978) (corporate speech);
Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977) (corporate speech); United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) (double jeopardy). The corporate per-
son was initially granted "constitutional personhood" in 1886. See Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
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privacy,62 signal a partial rebirth of the doctrine of economic due
process at a time when its protection is no longer needed.63 The
recognition of a limited corporate right of privacy creates a temp-
tation to ignore the logical and historical inconsistencies underly-
ing the doctrine.6 4 Moreover, by embracing a corporate constitu-
tional right of privacy the courts have ignored the existing state
regulations that require corporations to disclose significant
amounts of commercial information.6 5 Since the constitutionality
of these regulations has been repeatedly affirmed,66 it is submitted
that the continued recognition of the corporate constitutional right
of privacy is logically inconsistent.
FIRST AMENDMENT EXPRESSION AND PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Acknowledgment of a litigant's first amendment right freely to
express information obtained through discovery inevitably requires
the trial court to perform an intricate and protracted constitu-
62 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). The Bellotti rationale
resembles the economic due process analysis to the extent that it ignores the disparity in
private financial power between corporations and individuals through the use of the free-
dom to contract theory, see id. at 790, and disregards the difference between corporate and
natural persons, see id. at 777-83; Note, supra note 55, at 1853-56.
6 See Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1021-23 (D.C. Cir.) (corpo-
rate privacy not an absolute right), vacated, 724 F.2d 1010, 1010 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1984). Deci-
sions considering the corporate right of privacy have concluded that it is not equal to the
constitutional right of privacy afforded individuals. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 65-66 (1974); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950);
United States v. Stanack Sales Co., 387 F.2d 849, 852 n.9 (3d Cir. 1968).
65 See Ratner, supra note 55, at 27. Many regulatory schemes require corporations to
disclose substantial amounts of commercial information. See Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204 (1946); E. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 142
(1978). Due to the nature of their business activities, certain industries are subjected to
more extensive regulation than others. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72, 75 (1970); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir.
1976). Moreover, corporations cannot validly assert significant privacy expectations,
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., 327 U.S. at 205, and they can expect substantially fewer
privacy rights than individuals when they incorporate under the laws of a particular state,
see G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1976); Ratner, supra note 55, at
22-23. To justify an intrusion on corporate privacy, the government need prove only that the
regulatory statute is reasonably definite and is reasonably related to a valid investigatory
purpose. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 542 F.2d at 399; see E. BLOUSTEIN, supra, at 143. As a sub-
stantive constitutional right, however, the corporate right of privacy could only be overcome
by a compelling, subordinating governmental interest. See Ratner, supra note 55, at 27.
66 See, e.g., Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1940) (upholding constitutional-
ity of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888, 890
(10th Cir. 1939) (upholding constitutionality of Securities Act of 1933).
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tional analysis.6 ' This right was found to be an unqualified right of
free expression by the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in In re Halkin.65 The Rhinehart decision, while ac-
knowledging the existence of the right, refuted the Halkin proposi-
tion that freedom of expression is unqualified.6 9 It is submitted
that the acceptance of even a qualified right to express information
obtained through discovery is both unnecessary and contrary to
the basic policies underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Federal Rules predicate the issuance of a protective order
upon a showing of good cause,"° requiring the moving party to es-
tablish that dissemination would cause "annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. 7 1 The court may
issue the order if a party can satisfactorily demonstrate that dis-
semination will result in one of these five occurrences.7 2 In light of
the strong presumption of constitutionality attributed to the Fed-
eral Rules,73 the moving party's establishment of one of the five
" See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1029 (D.C. Cir.), va-
cated, 724 F.2d 1010, 1010 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1984).
8- 598 F.2d 176, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)
(Constitution does not require that government make available to press information not
shared with public; government has no affirmative duty to give out information not gener-
ally available); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (right to speak and publish does not
include right to gather information). The Halkin court's acceptance of Pell and Zemel
clearly indicates that there is no first amendment right to receive information through dis-
covery. Halkin, 598 F.2d at 190. Although the right freely to express materials discovered
was first raised by a media litigant, see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 201
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defendant alleged protective order was violative of freedom of the press),
the Halkin court indicated that such a right is generally available to all litigants, see
Halkin, 598 F.2d at 191; see also Sinclair, Protective Orders: How Much Protection Do
They Really Offer?, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 2, 1981, at 26, col. 2.
69 See Seattle Times tJo. v. Rhinehart, - U. S. , 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1984).
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see supra note 2.
71 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
72 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see supra notes 1-3; see also Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98
Wash. 2d 226, 232, 654 P.2d 673, 677 (1982) (court is authorized to prohibit use of discovery
information for unauthorized purposes upon establishment of one of five factors cited in
rule 26(c)), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984).
71 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). Section 2072 gives the Supreme Court the power to
make rules and requires that the rules be reported to Congress for review. Id. The Supreme
Court has upheld the federal rules as constitutional even when they have conflicted with
state-created rights. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965) (upholding rule
4(d)); Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946) (upholding rule 4(f));
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (upholding rules 35 and 37), modified, 312 U.S. 655
(1941).
Indeed, all statutes are generally entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. 2A
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.11, at 33 (L. Sands ed. 1973). The federal rules
are no exception. See 3A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra, § 67.10, at 236.
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statutory bases for good cause should satisfy any constitutional im-
plications that the drafters of the rules, the Supreme Court, or
Congress anticipated would arise.74
The Halkin court's superimposition of a complex first amend-
ment analysis upon the good cause test implies that rule 26(c) is
unconstitutional on its face.75 Although Rhinehart narrows this im-
plication by determining that protective order motions should not
be reviewed under a traditional first amendment strict scrutiny
analysis,76 even the requirement of a middle-level balancing test, it
is submitted, gives rise to an implication of unconstitutionality. It
is suggested that such an implication is insufficient to rebut the
strong presumption of constitutionality with which the federal
rules are vested.7 7 It is further suggested that a protective order, as
well as the entire discovery process, involves a form of expression
outside the scope of the first amendment.7 8 If information obtained
through discovery is deemed unprotected by first amendment
guarantees, any limitation on the expression of such information
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). Any standard such as the good cause test that is incor-
porated into the federal rules at least must be presumed constitutional in that the Advisory
Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress have all given the rules a stamp of approval.
See Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Compared with the Former
Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQUErl L. REV. 159, 159 (1939).
Originally, the good cause test was located in rule 30(b). FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) (original 1938
version), reprinted in 1 F.R.D. at CI (1940). The good cause test, along with the other Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, was reviewed in hearings before the House and Senate Judici-
ary Committees and was not changed. See Hopkinson, supra, at 159.
76 Cf. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (only
good cause standard need be met to establish constitutionality of protective orders). Judge
Wilkey concluded that the standard embodied in the federal rules is constitutional; good
cause represents the constitutionally acceptable standard required for the issuance of a pro-
tective order. Id. at 206, 209 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). It is suggested that Judge Wilkey re-
lied, sub silentio, upon the following syllogism: the federal rules are constitutional; the good
cause test is part of the federal rules; therefore, the good cause test is constitutional.
7'6 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1984).
77 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965). In Hanna, the Supreme Court
concluded that even statutory provisions that are only arguably procedural are entitled to a
presumption of constitutionality. See id. at 472-73.
7' See Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 258, 654 P.2d 673, 691 (Dol-
liver, J., concurring) (protective order review does not require first amendment analysis),
afl'd, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). Some types of speech have been found to be outside the pur-
view of first amendment guarantees. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
340-41 (1974) (certain libelous statements); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) (lewd, obscene, and insulting language). But see Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1984) (discovered materials not one of typical categories of
speech not protected by first amendment).
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cannot be an unlawful prior restraint.79 Indeed, Justices Douglas
and Brennan, two of the strongest advocates of a broad interpreta-
tion of the first amendment, have indicated that a court's exercise
of discretion to limit the use of discovered materials implicates no
constitutional issues."0
" Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940) (punishment of unprotected
speech not unconstitutional). Orders restraining extrajudicial comment in some instances
have been found to be prior restraints. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536
F.2d 1001, 1007-08 (3d Cir. 1976); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 204-05
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). However, some courts have held that no first amendment interests are in-
fringed by protective orders. See, e.g., International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403,
407 (2d Cir. 1963) (no constitutional problem with respect to information obtained through
depositions); see also Comment, supra note 1, at 773-74 (first amendment not violated by
protective orders restricting dissemination of discovery information).
At common law, unreviewable administrative licensing or censorship programs that re-
quired certain types of information to be approved prior to publication were called prior
restraints. Comment, First Amendment-Federal Procedure-Dissemination of Discovery
Materials is Constitutionally Protected: In re Halkin, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 424, 426 (1980).
The concept of prior restraints has since been expanded to include court orders that restrain
speech and are unreviewable because of the collateral bar rule. See Walker v. City of Bir-
mingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1967) (contempt citation for violating court order cannot
raise claim of constitutionality of order due to collateral bar rule).
Admittedly, protective orders do bear some similarity to prior restraints. First, violation
of a protective order leads to a contempt proceeding, which, similar to a prior restraint,
affords none of the procedural protections guaranteed in criminal prosecutions; second, both
protective orders and prior restraints act upon specific individuals and increase the possibil-
ity of a chilling effect in the future; and, thirdi violation of either is a direct attack on the
court's prestige, which often causes the court to augment the punishment in order to avenge
the attack on its authority. See Comment, Discovery and the First Amendment, 21 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 331, 343 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Discovery]. Even the middle-level consti-
tutional scrutiny adopted by Rhinehart, however, will result in upholding the validity of
protective orders under only the strictest of circumstances. Cf. Comment, supra note 1, at
785. Unfortunately, this undermines the purpose of protective orders, which is to serve as a
"safeguard for the protection of parties . . . on account of the unlimited right of discovery
given by rule 26." Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for the District Courts of the United States, S. Doc. No. 101, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 248
(1939) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Rules]. If discovered information can be classified
as unprotected under the first amendment due to the circumstances under which it is re-
ceived, see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), then restraining dissemination
of such information would require only procedural protection, see Note, supra note 4, at
1652. In Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1007 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third
Circuit took this approach by simply giving enough scrutiny to insure that protected speech
was not restrained along with unprotected speech. See id.
80 See Reproductive Servs., Inc. v. Walker, 439 U.S. 1307, 1309 (1978) (Brennan, J., in
chambers) (stay entered on discovery order dissolved on condition that protective order be
entered); Chamber of Commerce v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 423 U.S. 1309, 1312 (1975) (Douglas, J.,
in chambers) (refusal to reverse order compelling discovery because protective order had
issued). But see Seattle Times Co v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (embracing court's determination that protective orders must be subjected to constitu-
tional analysis).
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
The restraint imposed by judicially limiting the use of infor-
mation obtained through discovery is no more severe than the re-
straint imposed by federal statutory schemes that protect confi-
dential material from dissemination."' Unlike gag orders, which
completely foreclose a party from extrajudicial comment on pend-
ing litigation,82 a protective order permits a litigant to comment
freely on his claim, and restricts only comment on information
deemed confidential by the court.83 The constitutionality of both
federal privacy acts and gag orders has been upheld. 4 Although
there is widespread acceptance of the right freely to express mater-
ials received through discovery, 85 it is suggested that the purposes
of discovery and the court's inherent powers to control its own
processes indicate that no such right should exist. It is further sub-
mitted that limiting discovery through protective orders is an act
of internal judicial management that should not trigger an analysis
of substantive rights.88
" See, e.g., Census Act, 13 U.S.C. §§ 8(c), 9(a), 214 (1982) (limiting dissemination of
census information); Criminal Procedure Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982) (criminal sanctions
against government officers or employees releasing confidential data); Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982) (confidentiality of tax returns).
82 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 542 (1976) (prohibiting any-
one attending trial from releasing any information concerning testimony to public); cf. Chi-
cago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 247-48 (7th Cir. 1975) (district court rules
that prohibit attorneys from commenting publicly on pending litigation), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976).
83 See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1976) (dic-
tum). The Rodgers court dealt with a protective order that precluded dissemination of both
discovered information and information acquired independently of the court's processes. Id.
at 1006-07. The court did not pass on the discovered information, but ruled that restraint of
independently acquired information was impermissible. Id. at 1009. The Rodgers court
stated, in dictum, that any right to disseminate the discovered materials would be waived.
Id. at 1006.
84 See, e.g., Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982); United States v. Mangan, 575
F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1979); United States v. Tangerina, 412
F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969).
85 See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1-2; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (within discretion of
court to determine discovery suitable for circumstance); United States v. Balistrieri, 606
F.2d 216, 221 (7th Cir. 1979) (court has authority to limit discovery), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
917 (1980); Krekel Publications, Inc. v. Waukesha Freeman, Inc., 98 F.R.D. 745, 746 (E.D.
Wis. 1983) (constraints on discovery are within discretion of trial court); see also Dore,
supra note 1, at 8 (federal courts infer that imposition of reasonable constraints on use or
accessibility of confidential information obtained through discovery is within judicial
power). But cf. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958) (procedural rules cannot ignore constitutional limi-
tations). Even before the federal rules were adopted, courts possessed discretionary power to
control dissemination of information involved in the judicial process. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont
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Prior to the Rhinehart decision, the Supreme Court had indi-
cated that a court could restrain dissemination of information ob-
tained through 'pretrial discovery if it were necessary to insure fair-
ness to all parties under the circumstances.8 7  The same
considerations would appear to justify shielding discovered materi-
als from a litigant's request for dissemination."' The broad discov-
ery provisions of the federal rules are intended to enable litigants
to prepare adequately for trial.8 9 In fact, the only expectation of
litigants that the drafters of the federal rules intended to foster
was adequate trial preparation."
A litigant, therefore, cannot legitimately demand to receive
discovered information since it is received as a privilege granted by
the court.91 In its discretion, the court may limit or condition that
De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917) (trial judge has discretion to
regulate dissemination of trade secrets); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 198 F.
870, 875 (D. Mass. 1912) (court may regulate dissemination of information obtained by dep-
osition). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the regulation of discov-
ery is part of the management of the judicial process: "[W]e entertain no doubt as to the
constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of
trial, of information obtained . . .by use of the court's processes." International Prods.
Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1963).
" See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 n.21 (1981) (dictum) (courts often find
it necessary to restrict free expression of participants during trial). In Bernard, the Supreme
Court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting an order that restricted
all communications between certain parties. Id. at 103-04. However, the Bernard decision
did not resolve the question of the constitutional implications raised by a restraining order.
Id.
s See Committee on Rules, supra note 79, at 248. Under the "fairness" approach, the
party disclosing commercial information has an expectation of protection arising from rule
26(c), because the protection of commercial information has always been regarded as suffi-
cient justification for the issuance of a protective order. See, e.g., Essex Wire Corp. v. East-
ern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
89 See Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1973); Dienstag v.
Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Bocchino v. Witkowski, 41 F.R.D. 535, 538
(W.D. Mich. 1966); see also supra note 1.
10 See Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 234, 654 P.2d 673, 679 (1982)
(effective administration of justice does not require dissemination beyond that which is nec-
essary for trial), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). The expectations of the parties are rooted in
the basic goals of discovery: to assist in raising testimony expected to be heard at trial, and
to bring forth documents and other real evidence to be used at trial. Montgomery, supra
note 1, at 346-47. Most litigants and judges have no expectation that discovered material
can, will, or should be used for any purpose other than trial preparation. See Marcus, supra
note 1, at 54-55.
91 See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (litigants get no right of access
to information discovered but not generally available to public); see also Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (government has no duty to supply information not generally avail-
able to public); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (no unrestrained right to gather
information). A privilege is defined as a "particular and peculiar benefit or advantage en-
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privilege. 92 While the conditional privilege approach may appear to
conflict with the general principle that the right to express infor-
mation exists regardless of the informational source,93 the Supreme
Court has concluded that when information is obtained through a
government-conferred privilege, the use of such information may
be constitutionally limited.94
When considered in light of the tendency of judges to resolve
motions for protective orders solely on the good cause test without
reaching the constitutional questions,95 the Rhinehart holding cre-
ates the impression that the right freely to express information ob-
tained through discovery is of little consequence.9 Indeed, as the
joyed by a person, company, or class, beyond the common advantages of other citizens."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (5th ed. 1979); see Knoll Golf Club v. United States, 179 F.
Supp. 377, 380 (D.N.J. 1959) (peculiar benefit not enjoyed by all). Rights, while varying in
type and degree, are those powers shared equally among all members of society. See BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY, supra, at 1189-90. Privileges are generally considered less indelible than
rights and more susceptible to limitation and restriction. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-33 (1913).
92 Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-12 (1980) (per curiam) (government
conferring privilege of employment may restrict expression of matters related to it); Picker-
ing v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (government cannot demand complete
waiver of first amendment right for privilege of employment but can diminish or condition
such right). A court's restriction upon the use of discovered information may appear as con-
ditioning a privilege on the waiver of a right, cf. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (conditional privilege may extract right), a practice
that has been questioned, see Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583,
593-94 (1926) (although state may grant privilege upon condition of waiving a right, it may
not demand waiver of constitutional right). However, conditioning discovery upon a limita-
tion of the use of the discovered materials does not involve a right-privilege waiver if one
accepts the premise that discovered material is beyond the scope of first amendment protec-
tion. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
13 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 732 (1971) (White, J., con-
curring) (right to express not lost due to circumstances under which party obtained infor-
mation). But see Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (upon
proper showing, first amendment may yield when there has been invasion of privacy).
9' Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-512 (1980) (per curiam). In Snepp, the
defendant wrote a book detailing some of his experiences working for the CIA in South
Vietnam. Id. at 507. An express agreement of his employment, however, was that he would
not publish any information concerning his activities with the CIA without prior approval.
Id. at 507-08. The government, seeking injunctive relief and an order imposing a construc-
tive trust on the proceeds of the book, brought suit against Snepp for breach of contract. Id.
at 508. The Supreme Court held that Snepp's breach of an employment condition "irrepara-
bly harmed the United States Government," id. at 513, and that a constructive trust should
be imposed on the profits, id. at 516.
11 See Canal Author. v. Froehlke, 81 F.R.D. 609, 613 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1979); United
States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Johnson
Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
91 See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (first
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result in Rhinehart indicates, if the countervailing interests are
strong, the right will succumb to them.97 However, it is submitted
that the mere recognition of a first amendment right to dissemi-
nate discovered materials burdens courts and contravenes the
spirit of the federal rules.9 8 Requiring a first amendment analysis
hinders the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action" 9 -the goal underlying the federal rules-because it draws
the district court into-a complex and time-consuming balancing
process.' In addition, it is submitted that the interposition of a
constitutional analysis increases the necessity for judicial interven-
tion at the pretrial stage10' and focuses judicial attention away
from the valid expectations of the litigants. 102
The litigant's right freely to express discovered materials
threatens the use of stipulated protective orders.'03 Some decisions
have implied that the right to express information obtained
through discovery would outweigh even the use of purely consen-
sual confidentiality agreements.' 4 Limiting the use of protective
amendment analysis of protective orders is gratuitous); Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98
Wash. 2d 226, 258, 654 P.2d 673, 691 (1982) (Dolliver, J., concurring) (protective orders and
discovery "do not require a first amendment analysis"); see also Comment, The First
Amendment Right to Disseminate Discovery Materials: In re Halkin, 92 HARV. L. REv.
1550, 1553 (1979) (first amendment review is unwarranted).
11 See Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2199. Rhinehart requires that a first amendment analy-
sis must always be performed before a protective order can properly be issued. Id. In cases
dealing with commercial information, such as Tavoulareas, the first amendment claims are
likely to be minimal and the confidentiality interests great; therefore, the Rhinehart analy-
sis would not appear to hinder the granting of a protective order. See Comment, supra note
79, at 434.
I8 Cf. Rhinehart, 98 Wash. 2d at 248, 654 P.2d at 685 (first amendment analysis unduly
complex and onerous); see also Comment, supra note 96, at 1553 (federal rules give courts
power to restrict use of materials subject to discovery).
" FED R. Civ. P. 1.
,00 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
101 Cf. Comment, supra note 1, at 768 (discovery should normally proceed with minimal
judicial intervention). The Rhinehart test will also make stipulated protection agreements
virtually impossible. Cf. infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
102 Compare Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1984) (complex first
amendment analysis) and In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 182-96 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (complex first
amendment analysis) with Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310-
12 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (simplified good cause approach). Constitutional analysis of protective
orders wastes judicial time and increases litigation costs. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 2.
103 Stipulated protective orders are agreements between litigants, bilateral in nature, in
which each party receives corresponding rights of access and protection of disclosed materi-
als. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 9; Sinclair, supra note 68, at 26, col. 1. Stipulated protec-
tive orders free the court and the parties from the necessity and expense of litigating confi-
dentiality issues. Marcus, supra note 1, at 2.
104 See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir.) (contracts containing
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
orders will cause parties to assert various immunities and eviden-
tiary privileges in order to secure confidentiality, thus increasing
the need for substantive pretrial determinations. 10 5 It is suggested
that the congressionally and judicially approved good cause test is
sufficient to accommodate the various interests that arise in pro-
tective order litigation.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have created an efficient
and organized discovery system that functions as a crucial comple-
ment to the simple notice pleading used in the federal courts. De-
cisions that have interjected constitutional considerations into the
discovery process threaten the efficiency and vitality of that pro-
cess. This Note has proposed the abandonment of the doctrines of
the litigant's first amendment right freely to express information
obtained through discovery and the corporate constitutional right
of privacy. It is possible justly to resolve rule 26(c)(7) motions
without resorting to these troubling doctrines. To the extent that
Rhinehart furthers these doctrines, it should be overruled.
Whether the expectations of privacy of a corporation are valid
should be determined based upon the common-law tradition of af-
fording protection to commercial information when such protec-
tion does not impede the judicial process, rather than upon consti-
tutional protections. These expectations should be balanced
against the opposing party's practical, not constitutional, expecta-
tions of use. A litigant seeking to discover commercial information
can validly assert only the expectation of use in connection with
trial preparation. If a protective order is deemed necessary, and
such an order would not impair the opposing party's expectation of
use, then such an order could be issued.
Joseph R. Gagliano, Jr.
secrecy agreement invalid), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312
F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir.) (agreement to refrain from publishing comments about party inva-
lid), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911 (1963).
115 See Note, supra note 1, at 1036-38 (without protective order parties would assert
privileges and immunities to prevent discovery). The assertion of evidentiary privileges
would increase pretrial judicial intervention, delay pretrial proceedings, escalate expenses,
and impair the goal of the federal rules-adequate trial preparation with knowledge of the
facts. See id. at 1038.
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